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Résumé: Cet article étudie un effet pervers inflationniste de l'interdiction de la revente à perte. Dans un 
modèle où un producteur en monopole vend son produit par l'intermédiaire de distributeurs 
différenciés, nous montrons que l'interdiction de la revente à perte peut permettre au 
producteur de limiter la concurrence intra-marque et d'améliorer son profit en augmentant son 
prix de gros, rétribuant les distributeurs par le biais des marges arrière. L'interdiction de la 
revente à perte transforme le prix de gros en prix-plancher, augmentant le prix de détail et 
diminuant le surplus des consommateurs.  
 
Abstract: This paper explores the indirect inflationary mechanism allowed by loss leaders banning laws. 
In a model where a monopolist producer sells his product through vertically separated and 
differentiated retailers, we show that the ban of resale at a loss can be used strategically by the 
producer to increase his wholesale price and pay the retailers through negotiated listing fees, 
thus raising his profit. The ban turns wholesale prices into floor prices, thus increasing resale 
price and lessening consumers' welfare.  
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1 Introduction
Below-cost pricing or “loss leading” is a pricing strategy used by powerful retailers as
part of supermarkets’ price war: they make (apparent) losses by selling some products
at a price below their cost, to attract consumers in their shops. Yet selling some
products at below-cost prices may be damaging to small competitors who can’t aﬀord
to sell at such low margins, or to small suppliers, and in particular, in the market for
fresh products, farmers who have a limited bargaining power and are forced to supply
their products at low prices. On the other hand, retailers claim that such a strategy is
good for consumers as it reduces prices, at least on some products. The global impact
of such a strategy on prices and welfare, as well as its consequences on the share of
profits among firms, are diﬃcult to assess.
Loss-leader pricing strategies may have several diﬀerent motivations. A large lit-
erature in industrial economics has been devoted to analyse such pricing strategies,
and points out three main types of explanations. The most classical view is that a
below-cost price can be used for predatory purposes: in a dynamic setting, a firm
may choose to set her price below her cost (thus realizing losses) in a first period
to eliminate her rivals and then benefit from the monopoly profit in a second period
(see for instance Milgrom and Roberts [1982], or Telser [1966]). Yet loss leading may
also simply result from optimal pricing by a multi-product retailer, without preda-
tory purposes (see Ramsey [1927], Bliss [1988], or Chambolle [2004]): if there exists
complementarities between products, below-cost pricing on some products may be op-
timal for a monopolist, in order to increase the demand for complements goods sold
with positive margins. The third explanation is that loss leading with advertisement
may be used to attract consumers imperfectly informed about prices and supporting
shopping costs, thus increasing the quantities sold and the welfare (Lal and Matutes
[1994], Gerstner and Hess [1987]). Following the same basic idea, Whalsh and Whelan
[1999] prove that when retailers are diﬀerentiated by their location around a circle and
when consumers have information about prices of some of the products but not all,
retailers sell at a loss some products whose prices are known by consumers to attract
them, and then set their monopoly prices for some other goods. In such a case, to
resell goods at a loss is a way to compensate consumers for their imperfect informa-
tion. Finally, below-cost pricing by a retailer may have good and bad consequences,
and the literature does not conclude simply to assess this practice. Thus it is diﬃcult
to decide whether it should be allowed or not.
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Yet in a context where large retail chains dominate the market and have much
bargaining power towards their suppliers, retailer power has become an important
issue for many governments (see for instance the British Oﬃce of Fair Trading’s in-
vestigation in 1999 or the French Conseil de la Concurrence report in 1997). Overall
increasing retailer concentration as well as the development of own brand products1
have brought increased buying power that often led to conflicts between the various
actors in the system, mostly producers, retailers and consumers (see Dobson et al.
[2002]). Public policies aim at resolving such conflicts, and controlling vertical con-
tracts and pricing practices has become a target for competition policy. Within the
European Union, Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits any “abuse of a dominant
position”, and pricing practices resulting from such an abuse may be condemned as
anticompetitive. For instance, in 2000 in Germany, the Cartel Oﬃce ordered Wal
Mart, Aldi and Lidl to stop selling staples like milk and butter below-cost, as it was
hurting competition and could drive some smaller shops out of business. In that
case, loss leading was more or less viewed as a predatory pricing strategy. But some
countries have gone farther in adopting special laws preventing retailers from selling
merchandise below cost, thus setting up per se ban of below-cost pricing for retailers.
In particular, below-cost pricing for retailers is prohibited in Belgium, France, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain, and it is also prohibited for some products such as gasoline in
some States in the United States2. In this paper we focus on per se ban of below-cost
pricing for retailers.
In France, a specific law aiming at restoring the balance in producers-retailers
relationships has been implemented in 1997 : the Galland law. Among other mea-
sures, this law prevents retailers from setting the price of a good below a threshold
defined as the unit price invoiced by the supplier of the good plus the transport cost.
below-cost pricing by retailers was already banned before that law but the threshold
was not clearly defined, and the Galland law provides a very accurate definition of
the threshold which excludes all the anticipated rebates and reductions that are not
already on the bill at the time of delivery. In particular, all slotting fees that are
negotiated on an annual basis at the end of the year cannot be integrated in the
threshold. This definition is approximately the same that is used in other countries3
1See Berges-Sennou, F. Bontems, P. and Réquillart, V. [2004].
2Moreover, in California, pricing below cost sales is prohibited when the motive of such a pricing
is to promote the sales of other merchandise (cf. Eckert and West [2003]).
3The prohibition on below-cost selling imposed in the Republic of Ireland in 1987 uses a similar
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where below-cost legislation exists. The following figure gives a more precise view of
what can be considered as the “unit price” threshold.
pp p
Conditional 
rebates (listing 
fees paid at 
the end of the 
year, out of 
the invoice)
Non 
conditional 
rebates on the 
invoice
Retailers’ 
margin 
Hidden margin Observable Margin
Unit price invoiced Unit price (GTS)
Slotting 
allowances,
Marketing 
services… 
In the GTSOut of the GTS
Retailers’ margin and price threshold
Threshold
The rebates we call “hidden margins” are very important indeed, and the follow-
ing table summarizes some French data on how supermarkets’ margins are split up
between observable and hidden margins in 1995 and 1999 (as a percentage of total
margin): on average, for most products, hidden margins are the largest part of super-
markets margins, and in fact they express the bargaining power of large retail chains.
Negative figures in the “observable margin” column indicate that these items were
“loss leaders” sold at below-cost prices.
Product category Observable / Hidden margin
1995 1999
Grocery 26/74 12/88
Fresh and dairy products,
frozen items
50/50 34/66
Cosmetics, detergents -6/106 14/86
Drinks -1/101 11/89
Other non-food 61/39 56/44
threshold for below costs, as being the net invoice cost, excluding all oﬀ-invoice rebates.
3
Source: ILEC.
To progress in ascertaining the impact of the below-cost legislation, it seems in-
teresting to answer the following question: could a ban of loss leaders have adverse
eﬀects in itself? The question we address in this paper is the eﬀect of such a ban
on prices. Of course, the law has an obvious direct eﬀect: it forces the retailers to
increase the prices of the goods that were previously sold at below-cost price. So the
price of former loss leaders naturally increases at the time the law is enforced. But
this eﬀect is limited to the prices of loss leaders, and it can be compensated by a
decrease in the prices of other items if the multiproduct retailer follows an optimal
pricing strategy. Finally, the eﬀect of the ban on prices, on average, is ambiguous
and it is diﬃcult to conclude about the global impact of the law on average prices,
as we lack theoretical basis. Some empirical evidence is oﬀered in the Irish case by
Collins et al. (2001), who examine the impact of the ban on below-cost selling of
certain products since 1988 and show that the law had a significant positive influence
on retail gross margins on a basket of grocery products. In the French case, several
empirical studies gave diﬀerent conclusions. A first statistical measure was led by the
panellist Nielsen. It launched the debate by showing an average increase of 4.14% of
the prices of 1500 items, all national brands, in two months after the application of the
law. But a counter-test led by the Ministry of Economics concluded that, during the
same period, the increase was only 0.5%, on average: however, this study took into
account not only national brand items, but also private labels and discount brands
for each product.
In this paper, we focus on a potentially inflationary mechanism of the ban. Our
intuition is that the ban of below-cost pricing for retailers could allow a producer to
impose floor pricing constraints that could be used strategically as a price-increasing
vertical restraint. We present and solve the model in section 2. Section 3 proposes
some extension to the cases where (1) listing fees are two-part tariﬀs and (2) bargaining
issues are observable ex post. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a market for a homogeneous good produced by a monopolist P . The pro-
ducer cannot sell directly to the consumers and has to sell the good through a down-
stream independent retail industry, where two diﬀerentiated retailers 1 and 2 are
competing in prices. We assume that the retailers do not transform the good and
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that they resell each unit with zero retailing cost. We also normalise producing costs
to zero without loss of generality. We denote qi the quantity and pi the price of the
good sold by retailer i ({i,−i} = {1, 2}) on the final market. We assume that the
inverse demand of the consumers for the good at i ’s shop is as follows:
pi = 1− qi − bq−i (1)
Parameter b (b ∈ [0, 1]) measures the degree of substitutability of the retailers: even if
the good is homogeneous, customers diﬀer in their store preferences and b represents
the intrabrand competition when the two retailers oﬀer the same product.
Vertical contracting between the producer and his retailers is modelled following
the real timing of vertical negotiations. In most countries, commercial laws require
general terms of sale to be public and non-discriminatory. We thus assume that
the producer has to publish his (unit) wholesale price w before any negotiation with
his retailers. This wholesale price is the same for both retailers 1 and 2. Once the
wholesale price is published, the two retailers secretly and simultaneously bargain
with the supplier over rebates, which we call generically “listing fees”, transferred
from the producer to each retailer. We assume that the fees are bilaterally negotiated
following a Nash bargaining process, which seems consistent with the reality of vertical
negotiations (Allain and Chambolle, 2003). The producer has the same exogenous
bargaining power denoted α (α ∈ [0, 1]). These fees are assumed to be proportional
to the quantities exchanged (we test the robustness of our results to this assumption
in section 3.1 where we assume that the fees are two-part tariﬀs), and paid after some
delay, for instance at the end of the year: under a ban of loss leaders as the Galland
law for instance, it implies that these fees cannot be deduced from the reference price
which excludes all the anticipated rebates and reductions that are not already on the
bill at the time of delivery. Under the ban, the retailers thus cannot sell the good at
a price below the threshold w. In the last stage, wholesale prices and listing fees are
common knowledge, and retailers compete on the product market. The timing of the
game is as follows:
Stage 1: The producer sets his wholesale unit price w.
Stage 2: Unit listing fees fi , i ∈ {1, 2} are secretly and bilaterally negotiated.
Stage 3: Retailers compete in prices.
Let us depict the bargaining process more precisely. We follow Horn and Wolinsky
(1988) by assuming that the firms have “passive beliefs”. If retailer i does not come
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to an agreement with the supplier, it does not aﬀect the issue of the other pair’s
negotiation: the disagreement point corresponds to a situation where the other pair
operates at the anticipated equilibrium level. This assumption is common in literature
on secret multilateral negotiations4. It is quite intuitive that the retailers negotiate
competitively and thus each one do not know the outcome of the other pair’s negoti-
ation at the time of bargaining. It could seem more surprising that this assumption
also applies to the producer, but it simply means that the producing firm sends two
commercial agents to negotiate on the same day with diﬀerent retailers, and that each
of them ignores the outcome of the other’s negotiation: this is not an unrealistic as-
sumption. Furthermore, in the basic model we assume that the issue of a negotiation
in stage 2 is non observable ex-post by the retailers, so that the firms do not adapt
their strategies in the last stage: none of them knows whether the negotiation between
the supplier and the competitor succeeded or not, and each of them believes that the
other pair’s negotiation led to the equilibrium outcome. However we show in section
3.2 that our results are robust to changes in this assumption about observability.
We solve the game for its symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, comparing
the outcomes of the game with legal constraint (ban of below-cost pricing) to those
in the benchmark case (without the ban).
2.1 Equilibrium in the game with no legal restriction
The last stage of the game determines the optimal retail prices as a function of the
wholesale price w, and of the two values of the listing fees fi, i ∈ {1, 2} (see appendix
A1):
pi =
2(1 + w − fi) + b(w − f−i)− b− b2
4− b2 (2)
Anticipating these downstream prices, the resolution of the second-stage Nash
program gives the optimal values of the listing fees. Interestingly, the anticipated
profit of the producer in the first stage does not depend on the wholesale price: there
is a continuum of solution pairs (w∗, f∗i ) for i ∈ {1, 2}, satisfying the Nash conditions.
All the solutions lead to the same net transfer w∗−f∗i from retailer i to the producer.
The equilibrium net unit price w∗ − f∗i paid by retailer i to the producer is strictly
4For a detailed presentation of diﬀerent sets of beliefs and among others the passive beliefs, see
McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
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increasing in the producer’s bargaining power α:
(w − fi)∗ =
α(2− b− b2)
2(2− b2 − bα)) (3)
In fact, there is no commitment value of the first stage of the game, as the outcome
of the game is completely determined in the second stage by the negotiation of the
listing fees. Equilibrium downstream prices are then positive and smaller than 1 :
p∗i = p
∗ = 1− (2− b
2)(2− α)− bα
2(2− b)(2− b2 − bα) for i ∈ {1, 2} (4)
Depending on the value of f∗i , p
∗ may be higher or lower than the wholesale
price w∗: this equilibrium may be with or without below-cost pricing. Furthermore,
the higher w∗ − f∗i is, the higher the final price p∗ is, according to the double-
marginalization eﬀect. Thus, the final price is also a strictly increasing function
of the producer’s bargaining power α. Moreover, final prices and retailers’ profit are
decreasing in b, the intensity of competition between the retailers. Interestingly, the
net unit price w∗ − f∗i paid by retailer i to the producer as well as the profit of the
producer also decrease in b : by lowering final prices, retailers’ competition reduces
the “pie” of total profits and even the producer’s margin and profit.
2.2 Forbidding below-cost pricing
Let us now consider the case where below-cost pricing is prohibited. The pricing
strategies of the retailers are then constrained: they have to set retail prices above the
wholesale price. We look for situations where the producer uses the ban to constrain
his retailers’ pricing strategy. In that case, if the constraint is really binding, the
producer anticipates that the two retailers will have to set zero margins and that
retail prices will be p1 = p2 = w. He thus sets in the first stage the wholesale price
w in order to maximise the total profit he will have to share with his retailers in the
second stage: ew = p1 = p2 = 12 .
This partial result is quite intuitive, as if the contraint is binding, then each retailer
sets her retail prices equal to the wholesale price, and gets profit only through the
listing fee. The producer behaves then as a vertically integrated firm. We denote
this strategy as “floor pricing” strategy. We now have to determine in which cases
the constraint is really binding, i.e. when the retailers’ interest is indeed to set zero
margins. In such cases we will say that the strategy “exists” and this will happen
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when the optimal price chosen by the producer, ew = 1/2, is on the decreasing side of
the retailer’s profit function (ew ≥ p∗). Afterwards, we will have to check that, when
the strategy exists, the producer finds it profitable to choose it rather than another
non-binding wholesale price leading to the downstream prices p∗.
Lemma 1 The constrained equilibrium candidate exists only if the producer has little
bargaining power.
Proof : see appendix A2.
For small values of α, the optimal constrained wholesale price is higher than the
optimal non constrained retail price, so that the constraint is really binding. This
lemma is quite intuitive since on the one hand the optimal constrained wholesale
price is independent of α, while on the other hand the optimal final price in the
unconstrained case is an increasing function of the producer’s bargaining power. In the
unconstrained case, the optimal resale price is an increasing function of the producer’s
bargaining power: the unit net margin of the producer, w∗ − f∗i , increases with α.
Yet this increase is partially passed on to the consumers by the retailers who set
higher resale prices, increasing their margins to the detriment of the total profit of
the industry. This is a classical double-marginalization eﬀect.
More precisely, the constraint is binding for the retailers if and only if the pro-
ducer’s bargaining power is less than a threshold: α ≤ αe = b(2−b
2)
2−b . The threshold
αe is always in the interval [0, 1]. Furthermore, αe is increasing in b, αe = 0 for b = 0
and αe = 1 for b = 1: the floor pricing strategy exists for larger values of the pro-
ducer’s bargaining power when retailers’ competition is fiercer. The intuition behind
this result is as follows. On the one hand, in the unconstrained case, for a given α,
the fiercer the competition between retailers is, the lower is the final price p∗. On the
other hand, in the constrained case, the level of the unit price defined in the general
terms of sales of the producer is independent of b as the rule eliminates downstream
competition. Thus naturally, the condition on α for the constrained equilibrium to
exist is less binding as the competition is fiercer (as b increases).
To know whether this candidate is indeed an equilibrium, it has to be profitable
for the producer to choose the associate value of the wholesale price in the first stage
of the game. We study the profitability of the strategy in appendix.
Lemma 2 The floor pricing strategy is always profitable for the producer when it
exists.
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Proof : see appendix A2.
The producer always benefits from this strategy. In fact, as we mentioned, this
floor pricing strategy allows the producer to maximise the joint profits of the vertical
structure, but it also has an impact on the sharing of the profit among the firms.
Considering b as given, the share of the profit captured by the producer
³
ΠP
ΠP+2ΠD
´
naturally increases in α. Yet in the unconstrained case (1), because the producer nego-
tiates the fees fi in order to maximize his own profit, there is a double-marginalization
externality also increasing in α. Thus the bargaining aﬀects both the sharing of the
profit and the total joint profits. More precisely, the producer’s profit share in the
unconstrained case is Π
∗
P
Π∗P+Π∗1+Π∗2
= (2−b)(2+b)α
(2(2+α)−b(2b+α)) . In the constrained case (2), as
the bargaining only determines the sharing of profits, the producer’s profit share isgΠPgΠP+fΠ1+fΠ2 = α. The following figure represents the evolution of the producer’s profit
share in both cases for a given value of the parameter b.
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Producer’s share of total profit
A new threshold αs = b
2
2−b appears (notice that αs < αe). If α ∈ [0,αs], the floor
pricing strategy reduces (resp. raises) the share of total profits the producer (resp. a
retailer) captures, while if α ∈ [αs, 1] the floor price strategy raises (resp. reduces)
the share of total profits the producer (resp. a retailer) captures. This result comes
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directly from the double-marginalization eﬀect. In fact, when α is close to zero, a
rise in the producer’s bargaining power first benefits in a greater extent to the total
joint profit as it allows a relaxation of the downstream retailing competition5. Thus
the producer is able to capture a share of total profit that is larger than α. But,
for higher values of α, a rise in the producer’s bargaining power leads to a stronger
double-marginalization eﬀect that gradually becomes harmful for total joint profits.
Anticipating this negative eﬀect, the producer limits the exercice of his negotiation
power and thus captures a share of total profit smaller than α.However, we proved that
the floor pricing strategy is always profitable for the producer: when α ∈ [0,αs] , the
positive eﬀect of this strategy on the total joint profits always prevail over the negative
eﬀect on producer’s profit share. If we now compare retailers’ profits in both cases,
we show that there exists a new threshold αr (with αs < αr < αe) such that the floor
pricing strategy is profitable for retailers only if producer’s bargaining power is not
too strong: α < αr. Thus, even if the producer uses this strategy to relax downstream
competition, this strategy may be harmful for retailers when double-marginalization
eﬀect becomes too high.
Proposition 3 The ban of loss leaders leads to higher prices for small values of the
producer’s bargaining power.
Proof : see appendix A2.
More precisely, the floor pricing strategy is chosen by the producer in equilibrium
for α ≤ αe = b(2−b
2)
2−b . In that case, each retailer i negotiates a share
1−α
2
of the vertically
integrated structure’s profit, and sets a zero margin in the third stage: ep = ew = 1/2.
The final price is then higher than in the benchmark equilibrium, without the legal
constraint. The ban of below-cost pricing can be used as a mean to increase the total
profits of the industry to the detriment of the consumers, even in situations where
there would not necessarily be loss leaders in equilibrium without the ban: as we
have seen in section 2.1, in the absence of below-cost legislation, the final price in
equilibrium would be the same with or without below-cost pricing. The ban in itself
allows the producer to set a floor price6, thus reducing retailers’ competition as would
5This eﬀect is also pointed out in the extension with two-part tariﬀ hidden margin, since as two-
part tariﬀ usually allows to eliminate entirely double-marginalization eﬀect, we show here a (small
but) positive eﬀect of double marginalization, which may be sometimes profitable for the whole
vertical structure.
6Furthermore, this eﬀect is robust to the introduction of substitute products by the same producer
(see Allain and Chambolle, 2004).
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a vertical restraint like resale price maintenance.
3 Robustness and extensions
3.1 Two-part listing fees
In this section, listing fees are assumed to be two-part tariﬀs: the marginal component
is denoted f 0i and the fixed fee F
0
i . Just as with linear tariﬀs, there is no commitment
value for the wholesale price in the first stage of the game since the outcome is
completely determined in the second stage by the bargaining over the listing fees.
As in section 2, the equilibrium of the game is defined by the “real” unit price paid by
the retailer to the producer, that is the diﬀerence w0 − f 0i . The equilibrium does not
depend on the repartition between the input price w0 in the general terms of sales and
the unit price paid through hidden margins f 0i . Since the fixed part F
0
i determines the
sharing of the vertical structure’s profit, the level of f 0i simply maximizes the vertically
integrated structure’s profit. In equilibrium, f 0i would be zero if competition between
retailers were perfect and positive as long as b ∈ ]0, 1] . Indeed, when retailers buy
the goods at a strictly positive unit cost, the final prices they set are higher than if
this buying unit price were null: a positive f 0i reduces the downstream competition
between retailers and thus increases the total joint profits7.
Proposition 4 .The floor pricing equilibrium candidate always exists and this strat-
egy is always profitable for the producer.
Proof : see appendix A3. .
The existence of the constrained equilibrium is now independent of the producer’s
bargaining power. In fact, when hidden margins are two-part tariﬀs, the producer’s
negotiation power α has no influence on the level of w0 − f 0i . As we mentioned, with
the fixed part F 0i , the producer captures a part α of the joint profits, the level of f
0
i
simply maximizes the vertically integrated structure’s profit which is independent of
α. Thus, whatever the producer’s bargaining power towards retailers, the final price
and thus the sum of all profits remains the same.
Moreover, in the linear pricing game, the constrained equilibrium existence is not
always verified since the double-marginalization eﬀect raises the final price p∗ while
7This result was highlighted by Shaﬀer (1991).
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the constrained price is a constant 1
2
. On the contrary, in the two-part tariﬀ case, even
if double-marginalization is not entirely eliminated, it is considerably reduced, and p0
is thus much lower while the constrained price is unchanged. Here, with or without
the ban of below-cost pricing, the sharing of joint profits is unchanged: the producer
captures a part α. However, the total profit is always increased in the constrained
case, that’s why the producer always benefits from this strategy. Our results are thus
robust to a two-part tariﬀ hidden margin specification. However, one result no more
holds in the two-part tariﬀ case: here, retailers always benefit from this producer’s
strategy.
3.2 Bargaining assumptions
In this subsection, we assume that firms bargain bilaterally and secretly, but if pre-
viously one retailer could not observe if the bargaining between the two other parties
had been successful or not, she now does. Thus, if the bargaining between retailer i
and the supplier fails, retailer −i observes this outcome in the last stage, and she may
thus profitably renegotiate with the supplier in the new context where retailer −i acts
as a downstream monopoly. The disagreement point diﬀers from the one developped
in section 2.
Proposition 5 The constrained equilibrium candidate exists if producer’s bargaining
power is not too high and if it exists, this strategy is always profitable for the producer.
Proof : see appendix A4. .
More precisely, we show that there exists a threshold bαe (b), such that the con-
strained equilibrium exists when α ≤ bαe.
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Comparison of thresholds
In the above figure, we compare our threshold bαe (b) (in blue) to the threshold
αe (b) (in red) obtained in section 2. We easily prove that αe (b) ≥ bαe (b) whatever the
value of the parameter b. In fact, this new assumption on bargaining only reinforces
the producer’s status-quo all other things being equal. At a given level of α, the
producer is able to set a higher real unit price w − fi than in our benchmark case
of section 2. Thus double-marginalization is reinforced and the final price bp is here
higher than p∗ . Concerning the constrained equilibrium, as double-marginalization
disappears, this new specification of bargaining only aﬀects the sharing of profits
between the producer and the retailers, but the final price is unchanged. Thus, the
new threshold for constrained equilibrium existence is lower. However, we have here
proved that our results are qualitatively robust to this new specification.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we address the question of the impact of below-cost pricing legislation
on producers and retailers’ conduct. We highlight an adverse eﬀect of the ban of
below-cost pricing on prices, and show that the ban can be misused by a supplier as a
vertical restraint reducing intra-brand competition, in order to raise his profit to the
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detriment of consumers, and in some cases to the detriment of retailers. The ban allows
a producer to indirectly impose a floor price to his retailers, which paradoxically could
constitute in itself a break of the competition laws in Europe as well as in the United
States. This adverse eﬀect of below-cost pricing laws has been recently denounced by
firms in some countries like France and Ireland, where national brand suppliers were
accused by retailers to raise their prices in the general terms of sale, compensating
the retailers through higher hidden margin but limiting their competition strategies.
We show that this eﬀect may lead to higher retail prices if the producer’s bargaining
power is not too high, but also that the intensity of retail competition facilitates the
use of this strategy by the supplier. Furthermore, the ban’s inflationary adverse eﬀect
appears even in situations where there would not necessarily be below-cost pricing in
equilibrium without the legal constraint: this element clearly supports the use of a
rule of reason rather than a per se ban of below-cost pricing by retailers.
Our model proposes an original analysis of contracts between producers and retail-
ers. Although in most countries there are, on one side, general terms of sale imposed
by producers, and on the other side, a more or less observable negotiation on com-
mercial services, listing of products, slotting allowances, discounts and rebates, the
economic literature has mainly focused on simple linear pricing contracts as well as
some simple vertical restraints. Among theses vertical restraints, the mostly studied
in the literature are two-part tariﬀs, resale price maintenance, quotas or exclusive
territories. Shaﬀer (1991) proposed a theoretical analysis of slotting allowances, but
his formalization is similar to that of two-part tariﬀs. Here we try to approach the
real timing of vertical negotiations, and we take into account a bargaining of contracts
very closely related to those existing between producers and retailers. Thus we in-
troduce a sequentiality between the setting of general terms of sale by the producers
and the negotiation of what we call the “hidden margin”. This timing allows a better
understanding of producers-retailers relationships.
Of course, the conclusions of this study have been obtained in a simple setting,
and have to be balanced against other potential eﬀects of loss leading. The global
eﬀect of the ban of below-cost pricing by retailers should be measured according to
several dimensions. A global assessment of the law was beyond the scope of this study,
but we provide elements that contribute to the policy debate. Further research on
that topic could help public policy makers to be better advised of the consequences
of such legislation. In particular, the influence of the ban on the firms’ behaviour in
a broader context including inter-brands competition seems an interesting field for
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further research. In a joint paper (Allain and Chambolle, 2004), we study the pro-
collusive eﬀects of the ban in the case of competing vertical structures. The analysis
would also benefit from the integration of own brand products in the basket of goods,
to investigate the cross eﬀects of the producer’s decision on other products prices and
market shares.
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A Appendix
A.1 Equilibria of the game without constraint
We solve the game by backward induction. We look for symmetric equilibria only.
Consider the subgame where listing fees fi, (i = {1, 2}) and the wholesale price w are
fixed. Each retailer i anticipates downstream demands qi(pi, p−i), and maximises her
profit:
Max
pi
Πi = (pi − w + fi)qi. (5)
Given the assumed linearity of the demand function, this profit function is concave.
The suﬃcient first order conditions determine the optimal prices pi (i = {1, 2}) chosen
by the retailers as functions of (w − fi) : pi = 2(1+w−fi)+b(w−f−i)−b−b
2
4−b2 .
The second stage of the game is the Nash-bargaining over the listing fees. The
Nash program of the negotiation between the producer P and retailer i is as follows:
Max
fi
(ΠP −ΠsqP )α (Πi −Π
sq
i )
1−α (6)
where α is the exogenous Nash bargaining power of the producer and (1− α) the ex-
ogenous Nash bargaining power of the retailer, ΠP (resp. Πi) is the profit of producer
P (resp. retailer i) and ΠsqP (resp. Π
sq
i ) is the statu quo profit earned by producer P
(resp. retailer i) if the negotiation fails , i.e. if producer P only deals with retailer
−i (resp. retailer i does not deal with the producer). Given the assumption that the
firms have “passive beliefs”, the statu quo profits are:
ΠsqP = (w − f−i)q∗j (w, f∗−i, f∗i ). (7)
Πsqi = 0.
The simplified bilateral Nash program in the unconstrained case is written:
α
dΠP
dfi
[Πi −Πsqi ] + (1− α)
dΠi
dfi
[Πp −ΠsqP ] = 0. (8)
The resolution of the Nash program gives a unique solution. Given the value of
the wholesale prices, the optimum listing fees are:
f∗i = w
∗ − α(2−b−b
2)
2(2−b(b+α)) . (9)
These values fully determine the producer’s profit in the first stage. Downstream
price is then the same at both retailers’ stores, and is denoted p∗ :
p∗ =
(1− b) (2 (2 + α)− b (2b+ α))
2 (2− b) (2− b (b+ α)) . (10)
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Profits are:
Π∗P =
α(1−b)(2+b)(4−b2(2−α)−2α−bα)
2(2−b)(1+b)(2−b(b+α))2 (11)
Π∗i =
(1−b)(4−b2(2−α)−2α−bα)
2
4(2−b)2(1+b)(2−b(b+α))2 . (12)
A.2 Constrained equilibria
The simplified bilateral Nash program of the negotiation between producer P and
retailer i is written:
α
dfΠP
defi
heΠi − eΠsqi i+ (1− α) deΠi
dffKi
heΠP − eΠsqP i = 0. (13)
The resolution of the Nash program gives the following optimal listing fees:
efi = (1− α)w.
In the first stage, anticipating the constraint, the producer maximises his profit by
fixing the wholesale price that maximises the profit of the vertical structure (P, 1, 2).
In equilibrium, the producer thus sets the following wholesale price:
ew = 1
2
. (14)
We now have to verify that this candidate is indeed an equilibrium. We first check
that it is optimal for the retailers to set ep = ew = 1
2
. They will set zero margins only
if they are on the decreasing side of their profit function: the constraint has to be
actually binding. We thus need to have ew > p∗ (else the retailers would benefit from
setting positive margins). We study the diﬀerence exist = ew − p∗ :
exist ≥ 0
⇔ α ≤ αe =
b(2− b2)
2− b .
The constrained equilibrium profits are:
fΠP = α
2 (1 + b)
(15)
fΠi = (1− α)
α
fΠP
2
.
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We now compare producer’s profit in the constrained and unconstrained case, to
determine which strategy he chooses in the first stage.
We study fΠP−Π∗P , the diﬀerence is always positive whatever the value of b ∈ ]0, 1]
and α ∈ ]0, 1] .
Finally, the ban is used by the producer as a mean to impose a floor-price for α ≤ αe
and in that case, the equilibrium is the constrained equiibrium where ep = ew = 1/2,
the retailers sets zero margins and are paid through the negotiated fees.
A.3 Two-part listing fees
The optimal prices pi (i = {1, 2}) chosen by the retailers as functions of (w − fi) are
the same as in the previous section since the fixed fees do not change the first order
conditions. However, in the second stage the Nash bargaining is influenced by the
fixed fee F 0i . The equilibrium two part listing fees are:
F 0i =
(2 + b) (b2 − (2− b)α)
16 (1 + b)
(16)
f 0i = w
0 − b
2
4
. (17)
The equilibriummarginal component f 0i does not depend on producer’s negotiation
power α. On the contrary, the equilibrium fixed fee F 0i decreases in α.
Since final prices only depend on f 0i , their level will no more be influenced through
α.
p0i =
2− b
4
. (18)
And producer and retailers’ profits are:
Π0P =
(4− b2)α
8 (1 + b)
(19)
Π01 = Π02 =
(1− α)
α
Π0∗P
2
. (20)
Let us now turn to the constrained case.
Just like in the previous section, equilibria with p0 > w0 are destroyed by this
constraint, and new equilibria may appear.
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Candidates for constrained equilibria verify:(
p1 ≤ w
p2 ≤ w
. (21)
The Nash bargaining is changed by the two-part tariﬀ fee assumption.
The optimum listing fees are such that:
ef 0i = (1− α)w (22)fF 0i = 0.
Thus in the second stage, there are an infinite number of two-part tariﬀ equilibria.
Replacing the optimum listing fees in the producer’s profit function, we find that the
optimal producer’s wholesale price and profit are the same as those emerging without
the fixed fee.
A constrained equilibrium exists if and only if ew − p0 > 0. Comparing (14) and
(18), we prove that whatever α ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ [0, 1], a constrained equilibrium always
exists. Comparing (15) and (19), we prove that this strategy is always profitable for
the producer.
A.4 Ex post observability of bargaining success and failure
We still assume that the firms bargain bilaterally and secretly, but now each retailer
is able to observe, before stage 3, if the bargaining between the two other parties
during stage 2 has been successful or not. Thus, if the bargaining between retailer
i and the supplier fails, retailer −i observes this outcome ex post, and thus may
profitably renegotiate with the supplier in the new context where retailer −i acts as a
downstream monopoly. The disagreement point thus diﬀers from the one developped
in the paper. We here prove that our results are robust to this new specification.
The last stage of the game is unchanged. The second stage of the game is the
Nash-bargaining over the listing fees but the new statu quo profits are:
Πsq
m
P = (w − fm−i)qm−i(w, fm−i) (23)
Πsqmi = 0.
ΠsqmP is thus the profit realized by the producer when he bargains with a down-
stream monopoly. Solving the whole game in this bilateral monopoly context, we find
that:
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ΠsqmP =
α
8
(2− α) . (24)
The resolution of the Nash program gives a unique solution: given the value of the
wholesale prices, the optimum listing fees are bfi = bw− f(α, b). Profits cΠP and cΠi do
not depend on the wholesale prices.
We denote bp the equilibrium price.
When loss leaders are forbidden, retailer’s pricing strategy may be constrained. In
this case, we easily prove that status-quo are the same as those defined by (23) since
the wholesale price w cannot be higner than pm−i (the status quo are never constrained).
α
dΠP
dfi
h
Πi −Πsq
m
i
i
+ (1− α) dΠi
dfi
h
ΠP −Πsq
m
P
i
= 0. (25)
The solution of the Nash program gives the following optimal listing fees:
fi =
α (1 + 4 (1− w)w + b (1− α)− α)
4 (1− w) (2− α) . (26)
In the first stage, anticipating the constraint, the producer maximises his profit by
fixing the wholesale price that maximises the profit of the vertical structure (P, 1, 2).
In equilibrium, the producer thus sets the following wholesale prices:
w =
1
2
. (27)
We now have to verify that it is then optimal for the retailers to set p = w = 1
2
.
They will set zero margins only if they are on the decreasing side of their profit func-
tion. The constraint has to be actually binding for this candidate to be an equilibrium.
The constrained equilibrium profits are denoted ΠP and Πi.
Comparing w with bp, we prove that such a constrained equilibrium exists if α ≤bαe (b). The function bαe (b) is such that bαe (0) = 0 and bαe (1) = 1, and bαe0 (b) > 0. We
easily prove that bαe (b) < αe (b) .
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